This site documents ongoing technical work focused on ephemeral and disposable browser execution environments for security-sensitive workflows. The project examines how short-lived, isolated browser sessions can be used to reduce risk when interacting with untrusted web content, such as third-party SaaS platforms, external dashboards, and unknown or user-supplied URLs.
The work is grounded in threat modeling, cloud-native architecture, and execution-lifecycle security, with an emphasis on understanding isolation boundaries, teardown guarantees, and security trade-offs introduced by remote and ephemeral execution models. Rather than treating browser security as a static problem, the project explores how security assumptions change when persistence is intentionally minimized.
This platform reflects applied architectural research informed by real-world system design experience and active engagement with the application security community. The accompanying technical articles and experiments are intended to contribute practical insights that can be evaluated, discussed, and adapted by other practitioners working in application security, cloud infrastructure, and distributed systems.
Other sections of this site include personal writing and creative work, which are maintained separately and are not part of this technical research effort.